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DNA evidence plays an important role in the 
prosecution of criminals if it is used in the appropriate 
context. The relevance of DNA evidence lies in its 
potential to place an individual at the scene of the 
crime. However, evidence that the short tandem 
repeat (STR) profile of an individual matches that of 
a sample taken at the crime scene does not directly 
answer questions of the guilt or innocence of that 
individual. In addition, the successful use of DNA 
evidence depends on the size of the sample, the 
level of degradation and the purity of the sample. 
DNA lasts for varying periods of time depending on 
the sample collected, how it is extracted, and how 
it is stored. If DNA is extracted in time and stored 
under suitable conditions, it can last for longer 
periods than if it is collected later and stored under 
non-optimal conditions. 
With the exception of identical twins, everyone has 
a distinctive DNA signature or ‘genetic fingerprint’, 
which cannot change or be altered in one’s lifetime, 
and even after death. Because of the scientific validity 
of DNA profiling it has been utilised in a number of 
criminal prosecutions, including cases of homicide 
and sexual offences. Over the years the science 
behind the validity of DNA profiling has ‘wowed’ 
criminal justice systems to the extent that in some 
cases, it has been mistakenly reduced to evidence 
proving guilt or innocence. 
In the past, DNA evidence was never challenged by 
the defence, nor by the presiding judges. In some 
cases, innocent accused immediately pleaded guilty, 
doubting their ability to challenge DNA evidence. The 
Bokolo case, however, stands out as one in which 
the relevance of DNA evidence was placed in the 
proper forensic context.1 This case note therefore 
draws from the Supreme Court of Appeal judgement 
in the Bokolo case to underscore the importance of 
the role of opposing expert witnesses and the active 
role of judicial officers in placing DNA in its proper 
forensic context. The case note also briefly discusses 
The techniques used in DNA profiling are well established and scientifically validated. The scientific validity 
of DNA evidence can, however, be so persuasive that such evidence risks being reduced to proof of guilt or 
innocence. Thus, the incorrect use of DNA evidence could lead to a miscarriage of justice where the innocent 
are convicted and the guilty are acquitted. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Bokolo v S 
(Bokolo case), this case note discusses how DNA evidence can be placed in its proper forensic context. The 
article sets out the ideal role of expert witnesses, the role of opposing or neutral experts, and the active role of 
judicial officers in evaluating DNA evidence.  
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the basic scientific principles of DNA profiling. The 
discussion is intended to offer useful insights for legal 
practitioners, expert witnesses and law enforcement 
personnel.
Basic scientific principles 
of DNA profiling2 
DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. This is the 
genetic material that is passed from a parent to a 
child. DNA is found in every cell of the human body, 
except in red blood cells. Each cell contains the 
same configuration of DNA. In terms of structure, 
DNA is a double stranded molecule, composed 
of 46 sections referred to as chromosomes. A 
chromosome is a thread-like structure that carries 
genetic information arranged in a linear sequence. 
DNA is packed into 23 pairs of chromosomes. One 
half of each pair is inherited from the mother and the 
other half from the father. The 23rd pair determines 
an individual’s sex. An offspring always receives an X 
chromosome from its mother but may receive either 
an X or a Y from its father. Individuals with XX in the 
23rd chromosome are female, while those with XY are 
male. Chromosomes consist of linked base pairs that 
form a ladder-like structure. This ladder is twisted into 
what is referred to as a ‘double helix’. The sequence 
of base pairs in chromosomes differs from person to 
person. It is the unique sequence of a person’s base 
pairs that distinguishes him or her. Genes are found 
at a locus which is a specific physical location on 
a chromosome. These physical loci are referred to 
as codes. Two forms of a gene at a particular locus 
constitute an allele. At each locus there is a pair of 
alleles, one maternal and one paternal. This pair is 
called a genotype. A set of genotypes at multiple or 
numerous loci form a DNA profile.
DNA can be extracted from whole blood and blood 
cells; semen and sperm cells; tissues and organs; 
bones and teeth; hair roots and dandruff; saliva, 
urine, faeces and other bodily secretions; and 
epithelial cells found on clothes. Scientists have 
developed methods in which sequences of DNA 
are analysed at a specific locus on a chromosome. 
The STR is one of the DNA profiling techniques 
that is commonly used by scientists. The STR DNA 
profiling technique makes use of the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) technique. The PCR process 
produces millions of exact copies of the DNA at the 
specific locus to be analysed. This amplification of the 
initial DNA results in sufficient quantities for analysis. 
The PCR technique simulates the process that takes 
place when DNA is copied prior to the division of cells 
in the body.
The STR technique makes use of specific type of 
DNA sequences targeted during the PCR process. 
The STR constitutes a sequence of bases, which is 
repeated numerous times and is attached to one after 
another in tandem, hence the term ‘tandem repeat’. 
The number of repetitions is used to name an allele. 
For example, five repeats of the sequence for base 
sequence ATCG would be ATCG ATCG ATCG ATCG 
ATCG and will therefore be called allele 5. There are, 
however, two alleles at each locus. 
The DNA fragments produced by PCR are then 
subjected to a process called electrophoresis. This 
process produces a computer-generated graph 
called an electropherogram. On an electropherogram 
the alleles at each locus are indicated as peaks on 
a baseline. If the individual received the same allele 
from each parent, the electropherogram of his DNA 
will indicate one peak at a specific locus, otherwise 
there will be two peaks. More than two peaks at a 
specific locus can show that the sample is a mixture 
of DNA. Thus, if there are more than two peaks 
and multiple markers, it is likely that the sample 
is a mixture of DNA profiles from more than one 
individual. The electropherogram assigns allele names 
to peaks. 
An STR profile is therefore a series of numbers that 
represent all the genotypes detected for each locus 
in a particular sample. Thus, evidence that the STR 
profile of an individual matches that of a sample taken 
at the scene of a crime merely identifies and places 
that individual on the scene of the crime. Whether 
that person is the offender or not cannot be directly 
interpreted from a matching DNA profile. 
Having briefly discussed the basics of DNA profiling, 
I now turn to discuss the case of Bokolo v S, which 
forms the crux of the article. 
The facts of the case
Only the facts that relate to the subject of DNA will be 
discussed in relation to the case. The appellant was 
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charged with murder, rape and indecent assault of 
a child (his daughter). The appellant was tried in the 
High Court and was only convicted on the charge of 
rape. The appellant appealed against the conviction 
in the Supreme Court of Appeal and the appeal 
was heard on 23 August 2013.3 The appellant 
contended that he was not involved in the rape and 
alleged that he had not been at home at the relevant 
time. It was the appellant’s contention that, on the 
day of the offence, he went to work, then visited the 
shebeen across from his home at 15.00 hours and 
only retired to his home to sleep at 22.00 hours.
The prosecution’s case against the appellant 
rested entirely on the results of DNA testing. After 
the alleged rape, DNA samples from the victim’s 
private parts were secured, using two sanitary 
pads. These sanitary pads were analysed for 
DNA at the Biology Unit of the Forensic Science 
Laboratory of the South African Police Service. The 
two samples were referred to in evidence as pad 
1 and pad 2 respectively. The electropherograms 
showed that both samples contained a mixture of 
DNA.4 Based on the results of the DNA profiling 
conducted, it was found that the combination of 
alleles on the electropherograms in respect of both 
pad 1 and 2 reflected the DNA of at least three 
males.5 The STR profile of the appellant was not in 
dispute. The alleles at the respective loci coincided 
with the combination of alleles reflected on the 
electropherograms of pad 1 and pad 2, except for 
the appellant’s allele 22 at locus FGA.6 Although 
there was an indication at the relevant place on 
each of the electropherograms, neither reflected a 
peak labelled allele 22 at locus FGA.7 The alleles on 
the electropherograms at locus FGA were in fact 20, 
25 and 26 (in respect of pad 1) and 21, 23, 24 and 
25 (in respect of pad 2).8
Two experts, one for the prosecution and one for 
the defence, gave an interpretation of the results 
of the DNA profiling. The prosecution expert’s 
interpretation of the results was that they indicated 
allele 22 at locus FGA and that the STR profile 
of the appellant could therefore be read into the 
mixture reflected on the electropherogram of pad 1 
and 2.9 Categorically, the prosecution expert opined 
as follows: 
M’Lord, at that point FGA 22:25, you will see 
that there is not a clearly marked 22 at FGA. A 
possible reason for this is that FGA is a huge – is 
one of the largest … areas in the DNA molecule, 
so obviously when you have DNA donated by 
quite a few people, you can actually lose some 
of your bigger fragments. So although there is 
not a labelled 22, we do have indications of DNA 
being present where we would expect to see a 
22, so we can actually interpret it as such.10
Conversely, the defence expert’s interpretation of the 
results was that because the height of a peak on an 
electropherogram is proportional to the quantity of 
DNA, alleles not detected in a less enriched sample 
of DNA may be indicated as a peak in the more 
enriched sample thereof.11 Therefore a hint of DNA in 
a less enriched sample, if it represents DNA, should 
constitute a peak in the more enriched sample.12 A 
more enriched sample in this context simply means 
that it contains a greater quantity of the DNA than 
the less enriched sample.13 Pad 1, in the case in 
question, contained a greater quantity of DNA than 
pad 2. Pad 1 was the sample more enriched with 
sperm and therefore the electropherogram presented 
a much clearer picture than that of pad 2. According 
to the defence expert, there was a little block on the 
electropherogram of pad 2 that hinted at DNA where 
one would find allele 22 at locus FGA.14 However, 
if that was DNA, it should have been represented 
as a labelled peak and therefore an allele on the 
electropherogram of pad 1.15 In the absence of any 
other explanation, the defence expert opined that 
it must be concluded that allele 22 could not be 
detected at locus FGA on the electropherograms of 
either pad 1 or pad 2.16 
The Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgement 
The court in quo found the opinion of the prosecution 
expert more convincing than the opinion of the 
defence expert, and accordingly convicted the 
appellant. The divergence of opinion between the 
experts and the subsequent High Court decision 
formed the crux of the appeal in the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. 
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Attention will be devoted to the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court was 
presented with relatively divergent scientific 
opinions, and ultimately had to draw on the opinion 
that was most logical and valid in  deciding if the 
appellant was guilty of rape. Judge AJA van der 
Merwe, with the unanimous court concurring, 
ruled that, properly analysed, the evidence of the 
prosecution expert meant that it was possible 
that allele 22 at locus FGA may have been lost in 
the mixture.17 As such, the prosecution expert’s 
evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility 
that the allele was never there.18
Van der Merwe was inclined to accept the 
interpretation offered by the defence expert 
because the expert took cognisance of the 
alternative hypothesis.19 In the court’s view, the 
defence expert gave credit and made concessions 
where due.20 The court found the opinion of the 
defence expert more convincing on the basis that 
since it is scientifically accepted that a sample more 
enriched with DNA will show a higher peak on an 
electropherogram than the less enriched sample, 
it was not disputed that pad 1 was more enriched 
with male DNA (sperm) than pad 2.21 According to 
the court, the defence expert graphically illustrated 
this by comparing the electropherogram of pad 
2 with that of pad 1.22 This accorded with the 
evidence of the prosecution expert that semen 
was targeted when the samples were taken but 
that despite this there was a bigger component 
of the victim’s female DNA on pad 2 than on pad 
1. The court reasoned that this quantitive element 
of the interpretation of the electropherograms 
was not taken into account by the prosecution 
expert.23 The court therefore held that the defence 
expert’s conclusion that allele 22 at locus FGA 
was not present on the crime scene samples was 
convincing and logical.24 In light of the foregoing, 
the court held that the appellant should not have 
been convicted of rape by the court a quo.  
Analysis and observations
This judgement raises a number of issues in 
respect of the role of judicial officers in evaluating 
DNA evidence, and the role of opposing or neutral 
experts in aiding the courts to arrive at informed 
decisions when dealing with DNA evidence. The 
issues raised justify comment and are discussed 
extensively below. 
The role of an expert in the 
interpretation of DNA results 
Since the subject of DNA profiling is often not 
adequately understood by legal practitioners, the 
perception that DNA evidence is infallible obscures 
many potential problems raised by its interpretation. 
The divergent opinions of the two experts in the 
Bokolo case on the interpretation of the DNA 
results helps to unravel some critical problems of 
interpretation that are often glossed over when 
courts are confronted with DNA evidence. 
Even when the court accepts the DNA results as 
reliable, as in the Bokolo case, the results have 
to be interpreted once a DNA test is complete. 
The results do not interpret themselves; experts 
interpret them. This is one of the points at which 
human error or bias may come into play.25 The 
Bokolo case demonstrates that the manner in which 
DNA evidence is interpreted in court is paramount. 
Without prejudice to the opinion of the prosecution 
expert, the opinion of the defence expert in the 
Bokolo case underscored the critical need for 
experts to be mindful of alternative interpretations of 
DNA results.26 It is possible, as it was in the Bokolo 
case, that an alternative explanation can be offered 
with regard to DNA results. 
Jamieson, through his analysis of DNA reports, 
has showed that forensic scientists often fail to 
take into account other possible explanations 
that exclude the accused person.27 Jamieson 
observes that in casework it is common to ‘come 
across DNA reports that all but ignore any other 
possible interpretation than the one that provides 
the best probative value against the accused’.28 
Naughton and Tan have observed that the foregoing 
tendencies have been known to cause wrongful 
convictions in the United States.29 
The Bokolo case underscores the fact that it is 
not enough for experts, when opining on their 
interpretation of DNA evidence, to merely reiterate 
the validity of the science behind DNA evidence. This 
provides limited insight to judicial officers, as they are 
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conversant with the validity of this technique. Rather, 
it is important for experts to draw the attention of 
the courts to alternative interpretations, so that 
having weighed all the possible interpretations, 
the court can arrive at an informed decision on the 
probative value and weight of the DNA evidence in 
that particular case. 
The Bokolo case demonstrates that the manner in 
which DNA results are interpreted by experts can 
undermine its usefulness to the judicial process. 
If these limitations are not properly addressed, 
DNA evidence, though highly probative, can result 
in a miscarriage of justice. For experts to be of 
appreciable help to the courts in the interpretation 
of DNA results, it is critical that these experts 
understand the duty of an expert to the court. The 
function of the expert is not to decide the matter 
in issue. As Zeffert and Paizes submit, the opinion 
of experts is only admissible because ‘by reason 
of their special knowledge and skill, they are 
better qualified to draw inferences than the judicial 
officer’.30 This is based on the premise that ‘there 
are some subjects upon which the court is usually 
quite incapable of forming an opinion unassisted’.31  
Thus, since the standard position regarding the 
admission of expert evidence is that the court can 
derive ‘appreciable help’ from the expert, the expert 
witness must possess sufficient skill, training and 
experience to render the ‘appreciable help’ sought 
by the court. Hoffman and Zeffert offer a framework 
for the admissibility of expert testimony, observing 
that the expert must:
•	 Be	able	to	furnish	the	court	with	information	
falling outside the knowledge and expertise of any 
reasonable court
•	 Have	some	qualifications,	but	not	necessarily	
‘formal’ or ‘professional’ ones (i.e. a course of 
study coupled with practical experience)
•	Must	be	able	to	state	his	or	her	opinion	either	
as an inference from facts derived from personal 
knowledge, or provided by others
•	 Be	able	to	guide	the	court	to	a	correct	decision	
on questions falling within the expert’s field32
Allan and Meintjes-Van der Walt have submitted that 
just because a person holds relevant qualifications, 
it does not make him or her an expert on a specific 
issue the court has to assess.33 The person has to 
equally have knowledge, skill and expertise on the 
specific issue to be assessed by court, so that s/he 
can be of appreciable help in guiding the court to 
arrive at informed decisions. As J Addleson ruled in 
Menday v Protea Assurance Co (Pty) Ltd,34 ‘however 
eminent an expert may be in a general field, he does 
not constitute an expert in a particular sphere unless 
by special study or experience he is qualified to 
express an opinion on that topic’. Thus, with specific 
regard to DNA evidence, the expert must not only 
recite their relevant credentials to court, but must 
also, in accordance with their skill and expertise, 
identify the basis for their interpretation of DNA results 
to the court. Rather than promoting the case of the 
party that called them, experts should strive at guiding 
the court on the complex subject of DNA so that the 
court can arrive at an informed decision. This has 
been elaborated upon in the case of S v Huma,35 in 
which it was underscored that ‘the value of an expert 
is not to espouse and further the cause of a particular 
party, but to assist the court in coming to a proper 
decision on technical and scientific matters. It should 
therefore at all times be remembered that an expert is 
primarily there to assist the court and not necessarily 
to further the cause of his particular client to such an 
extent that he loses objectivity and in fact undermines 
his client’s case.’
The role of defence or neutral experts 
in advancing DNA evidence
Although cross-examination is supposedly the 
‘greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth’,36 arguably, the complexity of the technique 
of DNA profiling limits the effectiveness of cross-
examination. It is notable that there is a significant 
difference between attacking the opinion of an 
opponent’s expert through cross-examination and 
attacking that opinion through the testimony of a 
defence expert. The latter is exactly what happened 
in the Bokolo case. The opinion of the prosecution 
expert was implicitly attacked through the alternative 
interpretation of the defence expert, something that 
could not be done by the defence attorney through 
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cross-examination. Cross-examination would have 
been insufficient, in the Bokolo case, to uncover the 
alternative interpretation advanced by the defence 
expert to the effect that ‘in the absence of any 
other explanation, it [was to] be concluded that 
allele 22 cannot be detected at locus FGA on the 
electropherograms of either pad 1 or pad 2 and 
that the little block is in fact an artefact’.37 Thus, 
defence or neutral experts are essential to the court’s 
assessment of the reliability, relevancy and weight 
to be attached to DNA evidence. More specifically, 
it guards against the exaggerated probative value of 
DNA evidence. 
Thompson et al38 offer some useful guidance to 
defence experts on how to help the court place 
DNA evidence into proper perspective. The authors 
suggest that defence experts should have access to 
the laboratory report, which should, among others, 
state what samples were tested, what type of DNA 
testing was performed, and which samples could 
have a common source. The authors are, however, 
concerned that although there is a critical need for 
defence experts to scrutinise the laboratory reports, 
‘many defence lawyers simply accept lab reports 
at face value without looking behind them to see 
whether the actual test results fully support the 
laboratory’s conclusions’.39 Thompson et al. also 
submit that a number of factors (such as mixtures, 
degradation, allelic dropout, and spikes, blobs and 
other false peaks) can introduce ambiguity into STR 
evidence, leaving the results open to alternative 
interpretations. Thus, to competently represent the 
accused, the authors advise defence lawyers to seek 
expert opinion in this field so that they are able to 
uncover these ambiguities if they exist, understand 
their implications, and explain them to the court. 
While the role of defence or neutral experts is 
critical in informing the decision of the court when 
dealing with DNA evidence, the financial costs 
involved in marshalling reliable defence opinion on 
DNA evidence may be high. Indeed, one could 
argue that some constitutional safeguards, such 
as the right to counsel, offer the accused sufficient 
protection. However, the right to counsel may 
prove meaningless if a lawyer is unable to make 
an effective defence because s/he has no funds to 
provide the expert testimony that the case requires. 
In these circumstances, basic principles of fairness 
may require the state to provide an indigent accused 
with the ability to prepare an effective defence to 
such evidence. Goodwin and Meintjes-Van der 
Walt40 suggest that this problem can be resolved by 
providing the defence with adequate resources and 
with accessibility to an expert. They add that recourse 
to neutral or court-appointed experts might be a 
viable option.41 
Further, the equipment and software necessary to 
examine the data generated by DNA laboratories is 
highly sophisticated, and accordingly requires such 
substantial capital investment42 that experts in private 
practice might not be able to afford it, and thus may 
not be able to conduct independent scientific 
research and analysis. This may hinder both 
defence lawyers and experts in private practice, and 
undermine their ability to challenge DNA evidence, 
with respect to both methodological legitimacy and 
reliability. This may advantage the state, because 
when the government, which has resources at 
its disposal, adduces DNA evidence, it could be 
accepted as true without being challenged. 
The Bokolo case, however, illustrates a technique 
that may be relied on to surmount some of these 
challenges. The prosecution can allow the defence 
expert access to all the underlying material on DNA 
evidence, as derived from the state’s analysis. In the 
Bokolo case, in respect of the electropherograms, 
the defence expert only gave evidence based 
on his interpretation of the DNA results.43 He did 
not personally examine the DNA samples.44 The 
defence expert’s interpretation reflected on the 
electropherograms that the prosecution expert 
made available to the court.45 It is these same 
electropherograms that formed the basis for the 
prosecution expert’s conclusions.46 Thus, even though 
experts in private practice may lack the resources 
to establish their own DNA labs, they can still offer 
valuable insights based on their interpretation of the 
laboratory results, as in the Bokolo case. 
Can judicial officers adjudicate 
over science?
The Bokolo case is one of the cases in which the 
court conducted an exhaustive evaluation of both 
the DNA interpretation and the application of the 
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admissibility rules to DNA evidence. It is notable 
that on account of the scientific validity of DNA 
profiling, there has often been a tendency to 
equate DNA evidence with guilt and innocence. 
Naude has, for instance, pointed out that ‘not 
only can DNA conclusively establish guilt or 
innocence (because of its scientific precision), but 
it remains highly reliable for decades’.47 Indeed, in 
the appropriate context, the high probative value 
attached to DNA evidence is justified. Meintjes has, 
however, correctly demonstrated that although the 
science behind DNA is valid and accepted by the 
scientific community, problems may arise in the 
chain of custody of DNA samples, standards and 
techniques of analysing the DNA samples, and 
the interpretation of the DNA results by experts.48  
In these situations, DNA evidence may be less 
probative than it might initially appear. 
Martin49 also asserts that while most courts accept 
the methodology of DNA analysis, the collection, 
preservation and subsequent handling of the 
evidence can be challenged in court. Berger50 
aptly adds that a match only means that the 
accused is a possible source of the crime scene 
sample. The match could, in some cases, answer 
questions about the accused’s participation, but 
it does not prove guilt or innocence. Thus, even 
with the appropriate interpretation of DNA results, 
DNA evidence, on its own, may not necessarily be 
sufficient to establish guilt or innocence. The DNA 
evidence has to be weighed against all the other 
evidence on record. The aforementioned limitations 
therefore demand that judicial officers play a 
gate-keeping role in ensuring that DNA evidence 
is used in a proper context. The issue that is not 
resolved is whether judicial officers can execute the 
gate-keeping role when presented with scientific 
subjects such as DNA, which fall outside their areas 
of expertise. 
Over the years, doubt has been cast on the ability 
of judicial officers to assess scientific validity, 
especially with respect to complex subjects such 
as DNA profiling. Rehnquist,51 for example, was of 
the view that requiring judges to assess scientific 
validity was tantamount to requiring judges to 
become ‘amateur scientists’. Despite concerted 
efforts by judges to become informed about the 
technique of DNA profiling, it is an ongoing issue as 
to whether a scientifically untrained judicial officer is 
sufficiently competent to assess competing putative 
scientific claims by competing expert witnesses. 
Indeed, these suspicions could be justified in light 
of the fact that scientific data often entails concepts 
and terminologies beyond the understanding of 
lawyers and judicial officers. Meintjes has observed 
that ‘experts testifying in court are likely to express 
their conclusions either in verbal or numerical terms 
in respect of the probabilities of tests. [In these 
circumstances], the process of fact finding is a 
notoriously difficult one.’52 Indeed, some judicial 
officers are deliberately evasive when confronted 
with scientific evidence. The Bokolo case, however, 
reflects the fair number of judicial officers who have 
successfully displaced these notions. The approach 
of the Bokolo court demonstrates that judges can 
learn to think like scientists, at least in so far as being 
able to recognise faulty logic when they hear it.  
Van der Merwe pursued an analytical gate-keeping 
role in assessing the scientific DNA evidence 
presented by the experts, rather than drawing 
simplistic conclusions. To avoid placing undeserved 
weight on unreliable scientific conclusions, Van der 
Merwe examined the logic behind the interpretation 
of the DNA results by both the prosecution and 
defence experts.53 He conducted an independent 
assessment of the scientific validity and reliability 
of the opinion of the two opposing experts, as well 
as the implication of these opinions on the guilt of 
the appellant. Notably, Van der Merwe recognised 
that an objective analysis of DNA results did ‘not 
exclude the reasonable possibility that that allele 
[the appellant’s allele 22 at locus FGA] was never 
there’.54 Accordingly, when judging the real issue at 
stake, which was whether the appellant was guilty 
of the said rape, Van der Merwe actively, objectively 
and reasonably scrutinised the interpretations 
advanced by the two opposing experts. His ultimate 
preference for the opinion of the defence expert was 
consequently justified by the fact that this expert’s 
interpretation withstood logical consideration.55 
It is, however, notable that Van der Merwe could 
only arrive at such an informed decision because 
of his understanding of the working of DNA. He 
categorically observes that, in as far as the science 
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of DNA is concerned, ‘I derived valuable assistance 
from the work DNA in the courtroom: principles and 
practice by Prof Lirieka Meintjes-Van der Walt’.56 
Van der Merwe, notably, set out to understand the 
subject of DNA profiling so as to be able to arrive at 
an informed decision. Faigman has observed that 
the ‘scientific sea’ is very wide and deep and judges 
should at the very least know how to swim.57 Faigman 
underscores the need for judges to ‘have the basic 
skills necessary to read and understand scientific 
methods and to integrate scientific knowledge in their 
legal decisions without actually having to swim across 
the entire breadth of science’.58 In the South African 
context, Meintjes equally recommends that ‘all parties 
to the criminal justice process should grasp the nature 
of expert evidence … [as this makes the scientific] 
waters more navigable’.59  
Another insight that can be drawn from the Bokolo 
case in relation to the gate-keeping role of judicial 
officers, is the need for more informed judicial rulings 
on DNA evidence. It is unsafe for judicial officers 
to stop at taking judicial notice of the fact that the 
science behind DNA is valid and is generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific field. The Bokolo case 
demonstrates the need for judges to make a more 
elaborate inquiry into the methodological standards 
and the interpretation of DNA results on a case-by-
case basis. Judges cannot conduct this analysis 
without an understanding of the basics of DNA 
profiling. What Freckleton has called the ‘knowledge 
gap’60 needs to be bridged by continuous education 
on the manner in which DNA evidence operates. 
Scheck61 advises that for judicial officers, lawyers and 
law enforcement personnel to appropriately evaluate 
and make use of DNA evidence, they must undertake 
to learn more about molecular biology, population 
genetics and laboratory quality assurance. This is an 
uncomfortable venture, but will ultimately equip justice 
professionals with the basic knowledge to challenge 
illogical scientific conclusions, and consequently 
prevent incompetent evidence from getting into the 
trial record. 
Conclusion
This case note has underscored that if DNA evidence 
is to remain relevant in the dispensation of justice, 
it is critical for it to be placed in proper context. 
Experts in the field of DNA evidence play a critical 
role in ensuring that courts receive appreciable 
help from their expertise. However, to contribute 
positively towards the justice system, experts need 
to constantly be aware that their duty is to the court. 
In advancing DNA evidence and expert evidence 
generally, experts should desist from acting as ‘hired 
guns’ for the parties that instruct them. Moreover, to 
effectively advance DNA evidence, defence experts 
will need to play a more active role in evaluating the 
evidence presented by the prosecution. An even 
greater obligation rests upon judicial officers. Not 
only must they ensure that the person presenting 
the expert evidence is properly qualified to render 
an opinion on the subject of DNA evidence, but 
they must also understand the basics of DNA 
evidence so that when there are contradictions in 
the interpretation of DNA results by the experts (or a 
‘battle of experts’), they are able to critically evaluate 
the opposing experts’ views, and consequently to 
make informed decisions.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
Notes
1   There are other cases in which the role of DNA evidence has 
been underscored and applied in South African courts. For 
example, see S v Maqhina 2001 (1) SACR 241 (T); 
 S v Nedzamba 2013 (2) SACR 333 (SCA) at para [35]; 
 S v Carolus 2008 (2) SACR 207 (SCA) at para [32]; Mugwedi 
v The State (694/13) [2014] ZASCA 23 at para [2]. 
2   On the basic principles of DNA and DNA profiling, see 
 L Meintjes-Van der Walt, DNA in the courtroom: principles 
and practice, Cape Town: Juta, 2010; L Meintjes-Van der 
Walt, An overview of the use of DNA evidence in South 
African criminal courts, South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 1, 2008, 22–62; JL Mnookin, Fingerprint evidence 
in an age of DNA profiling, Brooklyn Law Review, 67, 2001, 
14–71.
3 Bokolo v S 2014 (1) SACR 66 (SCA) (Bokolo case).
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., para [25]. 
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., para [26].
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., para [27].
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
47SA Crime QuArterly No. 52 • JuNe 2015
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., para [30]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., para [31].
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 B Budowle et al., A perspective on errors, bias, and 
interpretation in the forensic sciences and direction for 
continuing advancement, Journal of Forensic Science, 54, 
2009, 798–809.
26 Bokolo v S 2014 (1) SACR 66 (SCA) (Bokolo case) para 
27. See alternative interpretation advanced by the defence 
expert. 
27 A Jamieson, The philosophy of forensic scientific 
identification, Hastings Law Journal, 59, 2008, 1044–1045.
28 Ibid. 
29 M Naughton and G Tan, The need for caution in the use of 
DNA evidence to avoid convicting the innocent, International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof, 15, 2011, 256.
30 DT Zeffert and AP Paizes, The South African law of evidence, 
Durban: LexisNexis Butterworth, 2009, 237, 321.
31 Ibid. 
32 DT Zeffert and L Hoffman, The South African law of 
evidence, Johannesburg: Butterworth, 1989, 100–101.
33 A Allan and L Meintjes-Van der Walt, Expert evidence, in S 
Kaliski (ed.), Psycho-legal assessment in South Africa, Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 2006, 343.
34 Menday v Protea Assurance Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 565 
(E). 
35 S v Huma 1995 1 SACR 409 (W). 
36 These words were uttered by Wigmore in 1940. See JH 
Wigmore, A treatise on the Anglo-American system of 
evidence in trials at common law, Boston: Little Brown, 1940, 
1367, 29.
37 Bokolo case, para [27]. 
38 WC Thompson et al., Evaluation of forensic DNA evidence: 
essential elements of a competent defence review (part 1), 
The Champion, 2003, 16–25.  
39 Ibid., 18.
40 J Goodwin and L Meintjes-Van Der Walt, Use of DNA 
evidence in South Africa: powerful tool or prone to pitfalls, 
SALJ, 1997, 170; See also S de Wet, H Oosthuizen and J 
Visser, DNA profiling and the law in South Africa, PER/PELJ, 
14, 2011, 185.
41 Ibid. 
42 On this reality, see ‘Laboratory technology trends: lab 
automation and robotics, the brave new world of 24/7 
research’, Science, 2015, http://www.sciencemag.org/site/
products/robotfinal.xhtml (accessed 23 March 2015). 
43 Bokolo case, paras [28] & [29].
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 BC Naude, Newly discovered DNA evidence: what South 
Africa can learn from the American experience, The 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa, 36, 2003, 224.
48 L Meintjes-Van der Walt, An overview of the use of DNA 
evidence in South African criminal courts, South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 1, 2008, 22, 41. 
49 LJ Martin, Forensic evidence collection for sexual assault: 
a South African perspective, International Journal of 
Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 78, 2002, 107.  
50 MA Berger, Expert testimony in criminal proceedings: 
questions Daubert does not answer, Seton Hall Review, 33, 
2003, 1127. 
51 This suspicion was expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
his dissent in the landmark US decision of Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 
52 L Meintjes-Van der Walt, The proof of the pudding: the 
presentation and proof of expert evidence in South Africa, 
Journal of African Law, 47, 2003, 91. 
53 Bokolo case, paras [30]–[32]. 
54 Ibid., para [30]. 
55 Ibid.
56 Bokolo case, para [7]. 
57 DL Faigman, Mapping the labyrinth of scientific evidence, 
Hastings Law Journal, 46, 1995, 579.
58 Ibid. 
59 L Meintjes-Van der Walt, The proof of the pudding: the 
presentation and proof of expert evidence in South Africa, 
Journal of African Law, 47, 2003, 91. 
60 I Freckleton, Court experts, assessors and public interest, 
International Journal of Law & Psychiatry, 8, 1986, 161. 
61 BC Scheck, DNA and Daubert, Cardozo Law Review, 15, 
1994, 1962. 
